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AT&T MOBILITY AND THE FUTURE OF
SMALL CLAIMS ARBITRATION
Jill I. Gross*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Like many other cellular service customers in 2002, Vincent and Liza
Concepcion bought what they thought was a free cell phone, but were
charged $30.22 in taxes; so they brought a class action against AT&T
Mobility   LLC   (“AT&T”)   to recoup those undisclosed fees.1 Because the
Supreme Court upheld the class action waiver in the pre-dispute arbitration
clause in the Concepcions’ cell phone contract,2 if they choose to go
forward,3 they will have to bring their individual claim of $30.22 in small
claims arbitration.4
Like other unsophisticated investors, Ella B.5 lost most of her modest
$20,000 inheritance when a securities broker at her local bank branch
unsuitably recommended she purchase a risky mutual fund instead of the
Certificate of Deposit she had requested. Due to the arbitration clause in

*

Professor of Law, Director of Legal Skills, and Director of Investor Rights Clinic, Pace
Law School. I am grateful for the able research assistance of current or former Pace Law students
Joan O’Connor Archer, JennyLynn Carey, Christopher Lufrano, Joshua Loring, Joelle Morabito,
and Stella Diez.
1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
2. See id. at 1746, 1753.
3. The AT&T Mobility dissent asked, “[w]hat rational lawyer would have signed on to
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”
Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661
(7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”)).
4. Id. at 1740, 1744-45, 1753.
5. Ella B. was a client of the Pace Investor Rights Clinic, in which students, under faculty
supervision, represent investors of modest means in their arbitrable securities disputes. Her name
has been changed to maintain confidentiality. See Investor Rights Clinic Brochure, PACE LAW
SCHOOL, http://www.law.pace.edu/lawschool/files/publications/investorrightsclinic.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2012).
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her customer account agreement6 and the fact that her damages claim was
lower than $50,000, any claim   against   the   broker   and   the   bank’s   brokerdealer affiliate would proceed as a Simplified Arbitration before the dispute
resolution arm of the Financial  Industry  Regulatory  Authority  (“FINRA”).7
What kind of small claims arbitration process do both the Concepcions
and Ella B. face? Dispute system designers have struggled for centuries to
provide an alternative to time-consuming and costly litigation for small
claims.8 This struggle is equally challenging if the parties have agreed to
arbitration as the means of dispute resolution. Commercial arbitration
forums,   such   as   the   American   Arbitration   Association   (“AAA”),   JAMS,  
The Resolution Experts, and FINRA Dispute Resolution, have designed a
small claims arbitration process to provide a lower cost and more
expeditious alternative to a live arbitration hearing when the dollar value of
the dispute does not financially justify the cost of a protracted arbitration
process, including multiple live hearing sessions.9 In small claims
arbitration, parties present their claims and/or defenses to an arbitrator in
writing only.10 In lieu of hearing live testimony from witnesses, and
following a truncated discovery process, the arbitrator reads written
submissions from both parties and renders an award solely based on those
submissions,  or  a  “paper  hearing.”11
6. Virtually all broker-dealers include a pre-dispute arbitration clause in their customer
agreement. See Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV.
1174, 1182 (2010). The Supreme Court has held that brokerage firms can enforce pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in brokerage account customer agreements even as to federal securities
claims. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). For a description of the most
common claims brought by customers against their brokers, see Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross,
Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
991, 1008-12 (2002).
7. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, FINRA, Rule 12800 (July 23,
2012),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbion/documents/
arbmed/p117546.pdf [hereinafter “FINRA Customer Code”]. FINRA administers virtually all
arbitrations of securities disputes. See Arbitration and Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/index.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
8. See Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A
Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219, 221-22 (1975).
9. See Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures, AAA (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer? (follow “Supplementary Procedures for
Consumer-Related Disputes” hyperlink); JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures,
JAMS, THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS (July 15, 2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-streamlinedarbitration/; Simplified Arbitrations, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitration/SpecialProcedures/SimplifiedArbitrations/index.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012);
FINRA Customer Code, supra note 7, Rule 12800.
10. See, e.g., FINRA Customer Code, supra note 7, Rule 12800.
11. See, e.g., id.
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Small claims arbitration has not received much attention from dispute
system designers and scholars. Several coalescing developments require a
reassessment of the small claims arbitration process: (1) the Supreme
Court’s   strong   endorsement   of   the   Federal   Arbitration   Act   (“FAA”)12 and
arbitration as a favored dispute resolution mechanism,13 (2) the proliferation
of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer products and services
agreements,14 (3) the judicialization of arbitration,15 and, (4) most recently,
the   Court’s   condemnation   of   class   arbitration   as   a   procedural   device   to  
resolve aggregable yet arbitrable low dollar value claims. 16 By inserting a
class action waiver clause in their consumer contracts, companies can
prevent consumers from aggregating small claims, forcing them to pursue
small claims individually.17 Arbitration law expert Professor Sarah Cole
recently  wrote  that  “the  most  pressing  issue  in  consumer  arbitration,  in  the  
wake of recent Supreme Court decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for
consumers  with  low  value  claims.”18
The funneling of low dollar value claims into simplified arbitration has
serious implications for consumers and investors of modest means seeking
substantive and procedural justice in a forum in which their claim is heard
solely on the papers.19 Substantively, pro se parties may not have the
education, training, or ability to effectively communicate their complex
arguments in writing.20 Moreover,   “where   credibility   and   veracity are at
issue, . . . written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for
decision.”21
12. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011); 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2006).
13. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the
Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 462-63 (2011).
14. Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting
Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 116 (2010) (“Companies increasingly
include arbitration clauses among the ‘modular’ terms cobbled into boilerplate contracts.”).
15. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
8-9, 11-16, 19, 21, 24 (describing transformation of arbitration to more court-like litigation
process).
16. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-52 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010).
17. Cole, On Babies and Bathwater, supra note 13, at 463.
18. Id. at 464.
19. Id. at 465-66; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-69 (1970).
20. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269-70 (“Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most
[welfare] recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who
cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility
of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the
decision maker appears to regard as important.”).
21. Id. at 269.
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Procedurally, studies show that disputants perceive a dispute resolution
process   as   unfair   if   they   have   not   been   given   a   “voice,”   an   ample  
opportunity to be heard.22
Empirical evidence suggests that when stakeholders believe a system is
procedurally just, they are more likely to buy into the result and the
process, comply with the outcome, comply with the law in the future,
increase commitment to the organization, accord respect and loyalty to the
23
institution, and perceive the system to be legitimate.

In   turn,   stronger   perceptions   of   procedural   fairness   impact   a   disputant’s  
perception of substantive fairness.24
This article focuses on small claims arbitration and examines the
impact of AT&T Mobility on the legitimacy of the process. Part II of the
article  describes  the  Supreme  Court’s  AT&T Mobility decision,25 which held
that the FAA preempts a California rule that declared a class arbitration
waiver in a consumer contract unconscionable.26 Part III describes the
primary features of the two options remaining for the Concepcions—small
claims court and small claims arbitration, as well as their perceived
advantages and disadvantages. Part IV demonstrates that courts have
endorsed simplified arbitration. Part V examines whether simplified
arbitration is a fair method of resolving small arbitration claims. Part VI

22. See Douglas Denton, Procedural Fairness in the California Courts, 44 CT. REV. 44, 4446 (2007-08) (surveying 2,400 members of the public with direct experience in high volume court
and finding that disputants’ “procedural fairness concerns outweighed winning or losing a case”
and that a “common sentiment . . . was a strong desire to ‘tell my story directly to the judge.’”);
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) (theorizing
importance of procedural justice for legitimacy of dispute resolution processes).
23. Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute System Design, 92
MINN. L. REV. 161, 214-15 (2007); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Judging Arbitration: The
Findings of Procedural Justice Research, in AAA HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
41, 48 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette Jaeggi eds., 2006) (stating that “arbitration litigants
will be satisfied with arbitration if they think the process is fair and will be dissatisfied if they
think the process is unfair”); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S
FIELDBOOK 165, 170 (Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) (“people who
believe that they have been treated in a procedurally fair manner are more likely to conclude that
the resulting outcome is substantively fair, even if that outcome is unfavorable”); Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS
L.J. 127, 134 (2011) (“Research has suggested that procedural justice is an important component
of individuals’ judgments about whether to comply with legal rules and authorities, as well as
whether legal systems are legitimate. When people feel that they have received fair treatment,
they are more likely to adhere to, accept, and feel satisfied with a given outcome, and to view the
system that gave rise to that outcome as legitimate.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN L. REV. 1631, 1666-67 (2005) (citing studies).
24. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, supra note 23, at 170.
25. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745-46 (2011).
26. Id. at 1746, 1753.
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explores other dispute resolution models for resolving small dollar value
commercial disputes, including on-line dispute resolution, telephonic
arbitration, and a small claims arbitrator. Part VII concludes by urging
dispute system designers to consider changing the default mechanism of
arbitrating   small   claims   cases   from   paper   or   “desk”   arbitration   to   a   live  
hearing before a small claims arbitrator.
II. AT&T MOBILITY AND CLASS ARBITRATION
Congress   enacted   the   FAA   in   1925   “to   reverse   the   longstanding  
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place
arbitration   agreements   upon   the   same   footing   as   other   contracts.”27 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to embody a strong national policy
favoring arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.28
Although the FAA does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction,29 its
only substantive provision (section 2)—which declares that agreements to
arbitrate  are  “valid,  irrevocable,  and  enforceable,  save  upon  such  grounds  as  
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of  any  contract”30—applies in
both state and federal court.31 As a result, the FAA governs virtually every
arbitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction,32 and “create[s]  a  
body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration

27. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
28. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985);
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (recognizing a
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”).
29. Valden v. Discovery Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009); Hall Street Assoc. LLC v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581-82 (2008); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. at 26-27, n. 34.
30. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The latter phrase of this section is known as the FAA’s “saving
clause.” AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
31. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (“The statements of the Court in
Prima Paint that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly
implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts.”).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 2. By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate “transactions
involving commerce.” Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase very broadly to include
any transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, even if the parties did not anticipate an
interstate impact. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57 (2003) (applying FAA to
“debt restructuring agreements” as “‘involving commerce’”); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81 (2002) (applying FAA to securities arbitrations); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995) (interpreting the reach of the FAA broadly to all
transactions “involving commerce” and stating that “‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the
functional equivalent of ‘affecting’”).
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agreement  within  the  coverage  of  the  Act.”33 Under that substantive law of
arbitrability, most federal statutory claims are arbitrable.34
Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the FAA
preempts state laws that treat arbitration agreements differently from other
contracts  and  that  “stand  as  an  obstacle  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  FAA’s  
objectives.”35 Where a state law prohibits the arbitration of a particular type
of claim, courts readily find that the FAA preempts that state law.36 More
recently,   the   Court   ruled   that   the   FAA   preempted   California’s   contract  
defense of unconscionability—which on its face was not anti-arbitration—
because California state courts were applying it in a manner that was de
facto disfavoring arbitration.37
In its cellular phone service contracts, AT&T included a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs from bringing
class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated on an
individual basis.38 In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in district court,
33. Moses   H.   Cone   Mem’l   Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. The Court defined arbitrability in this
context as “the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at 26.
34. E.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669, 673 (2012) (claims arising
under the Credit Repair Organizations Act are arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
arbitrable).
35. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.
Ct. 1201, 1202-04 (2012) (preempting a West Virginia Supreme Court ruling that voided as
against public policy pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to
negligence claims); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349-50, 356, 359 (2008) (preempting a
California law granting exclusive jurisdiction to Labor Commissioner to decide disputes arising
under the Talent Agencies Act); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443-46,
449 (2006) (preempting a Florida judicial rule that precluded arbitrators from deciding the legality
of an allegedly usurious contract containing an arbitration agreement); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (preempting a Montana statute requiring specific type of
notice in contract containing arbitration clause); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514
U.S. 52, 53-54, 56, 63-64 (1995) (preempting a New York law precluding arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 275 (preempting an
Alabama statute invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts).
36. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (preempting a West Virginia
Supreme Court rule voiding as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing
home contracts with respect to negligence claims); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 8 (preempting a
provision of the California Franchise Investment Law that required judicial, not arbitral, resolution
of claims brought under the statute).
37. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746-48 (2011).
38. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB) 2008 WL 5216255 *2 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740, amended in part, 06CV676 DMS (NLS), 2012
WL 1681762 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2012). Notably, the arbitration clause also stated: “[f]or claims of
$10,000 or less, customers have the exclusive right to choose whether the arbitrator will conduct
an in-person hearing, a telephonic hearing, or a ‘desk’ arbitration wherein the arbitration is
conducted ‘solely on the bases of documents submitted to this arbitrator.’” Id.
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alleging  that  AT&T’s  practice  of  charging  sales  tax  on  a  phone  advertised  
as  “free”  was  fraudulent.39 In December 2006, after the Concepcions filed
their claim, AT&T revised the arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T
would pay a customer $7,500 if an arbitrator found in favor of a California
customer on the merits of a customer dispute, and awarded more than the
last AT&T settlement offer.40
Two   years   later,   after   the   Concepcions’   case   was   consolidated   with   a  
putative class action alleging, inter alia, identical claims of false advertising
and fraud, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the revised
agreement.41 After both the district court and the Ninth Circuit refused to
enforce the arbitration agreement on the ground that the class action waiver
was unconscionable because it had a deterrent effect on class actions and
the efficient resolution of third party claims, AT&T sought review in the
Supreme Court.42
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by
Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito),
held   that   the   FAA   preempts   California’s   Discover Bank rule, which
“classif[ied]   most   collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable.”43 The Court concluded that the Discover Bank rule
created a different law of unconscionability for class action waivers in
adhesive arbitration contracts.44 Thus, the FAA preempts the rule because
“[r]equiring   the   availability   of   classwide   arbitration   interferes   with  
39. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d at 853, rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility, 131
S. Ct. 1740 (Concepcion was consolidated with Laster in September 2006).
40. Id.
41. Id. The agreement also had an opt-out provision permitting either party to initiate a
claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *2.
42. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
43. Id. at 1743, 1746, 1753.
44. Id. at 1746. The Supreme Court noted that, under California law, a court may refuse to
enforce a contract that it finds “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, or [it] may
limit the application of any unconscionable clause. A finding of unconscionability requires a
procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to
unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” Id. (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110
(Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740, the California Supreme Court applied
this unconscionability law to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and held:
when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,
then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for
[its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.” Under these
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be
enforced.

Id. at 1110 (citation omitted).
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fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA.”45 The  Court  noted  that,  although  California’s  “rule  does  not  
require class-wide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to
demand it ex post,”  thus  defeating the purposes of the FAA.46
Justice  Scalia’s  majority  opinion  exhibited  the  Court’s  disdain  for  class  
arbitration.47 The Court discussed three characteristics of class arbitration
that it concluded defeat the purposes of the FAA and hinder the flexible
party-driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality and speed;
(2) a requisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) an increase in risks
to defendants due to the lack of judicial review.48 In contrast, the AT&T
Mobility dissent claimed that class proceedings are necessary to protect
against small-value claims falling through the cracks of the legal system.49
Justice   Scalia   responded   to   the   dissent’s   concern   by   stating   that   “[s]tates  
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is
desirable   for   unrelated   reasons.”50 Thus, the Court went so far as to
characterize class arbitration as not arbitration at all within the meaning of
the FAA, but a process that alters the fundamental attributes of arbitration.51
Academics and the media viewed AT&T Mobility as signaling the death
of class arbitration as a method to redress small dollar value claims. 52 The
45. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1755. The majority was persuaded by research that
demonstrated that state courts had become more likely to find an arbitration agreement
unconscionable as opposed to other contracts. Id. at 1747. For a more complete analysis of the
impact of the case on the FAA preemption doctrine, see Jill Gross, AT&T Mobility and FAA
Premption, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033248.
46. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
47. Id. at 1750-53. The Court manifested this disdain one year earlier in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010).
48. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751-52. Although the majority expressly included the
procedural expediency of arbitration as one of the FAA’s purposes with which the Discover Bank
rule interferes, the dissent referred to the Court’s Dean Witter decision in which it specifically
“‘reject[s] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious
resolution of claims.’” Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
49. Id. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1753.
51. Id. at 1750-1753.
52. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704-05 (2012) (“It is highly ironic but no less distressing
that a case with a name meaning ‘conception’ should come to signify death for the legal claims of
many potential plaintiffs.”); S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of
Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791928; Sarah Cole, Continuing the
Discussion of the AT&T v. Concepcion Decision: Implications for the Future, ADR Prof Blog,
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=2312 (“It would thus appear that the era of class
arbitration is over before it really ever began—unless Congress can be persuaded to amend the
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dissent   cautioned   that   “nonclass arbitration over such sums will also
sometimes have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims (say, for
example, where claiming the $30.22 were to involve filling out many forms
that require technical knowledge or waiting at great length while a call is
placed   on   hold).”53 Commentators agreed with the dissent that many
consumers would not be able to pursue their claims, and thus vindicate their
statutory rights,54 if they could not consolidate their claims with others into
larger groups.55
Post-AT&T Mobility, will claimants pursue low dollar-value claims?56
If so, what forum would hear those claims? Would those forums enable
FAA to permit class arbitration, at least in cases involving low value claims, where consumers are
unlikely to have practical recourse to a remedy through traditional bilateral arbitration.”); Marcia
Coyle, Divided Justices Back Mandatory Arbitration for Consumer Complaints, N.Y. L.J. (Apr.
28, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202491963074&slreturn=1 (LEXIS account
required) (quoting lawyer for Concepcions as stating “[t]he decision will make it harder for people
with civil rights, labor, consumer and other kinds of claims that stem from corporate wrongdoing
to join together to obtain their rightful compensation.”).
53. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. The Court has suggested, but not expressly held, that a disputant could claim that an
arbitration agreement is unenforceable because an unfair aspect of the arbitration process
precludes that party from vindicating his statutory rights. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (“so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federal] statute [providing
that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”); Green Tree
Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–91 (2000) (suggesting that excessive or overly
burdensome forum fees, if proven, might bar a court from enforcing an arbitration agreement on
the grounds that one party cannot vindicate its statutory rights); see Stephen J. Ware, The Case for
Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and
Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 269–73 (2006) (describing the “effectively vindicate”
doctrine and noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has yet to flesh out the . . . doctrine”). The Court
recently granted certiorari in a case in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, post AT&T
Mobility,  invalidated  a  class  arbitration  waiver  under  the  “vindicating  rights”  doctrine. In re Am.
Express Merchs.' Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., No. 12-133, 2012 WL 3096737 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012). A decision in this case
to reverse the Second Circuit could be the death-knell for the doctrine.
55. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion: From unconscionability to
vindication of rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/
09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights (“[T]he AT&T
ruling is the real game-changer for class action litigation, as it permits most of the companies that
touch consumers’ day-to-day lives to place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by
simply incorporating class waiver language into their standard-form contracts.”).
56. Evidently, the Concepcions continued to challenge the validity of their arbitration clause,
but lost; on remand from the Supreme Court, the district court held a status conference, issued an
Order to Show Cause (why it should not grant AT&T Mobility’s motion to compel arbitration in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision) and set up a briefing schedule. Laster v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 05CV1167 DMS (WVG), 2012 WL 1681762 at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2012). On May 9,
2012, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted AT&T
Mobility’s motion to compel arbitration. Id. The court reasoned that, apart from the now FAApreempted Discover Bank doctrine, the arbitration agreement was still valid under California’s

2.GROSS.MACRO.10.29.12 (DO NOT DELETE)

56

S OU TH WES TER N LA W REVIE W

11/26/2012 12:53 PM

[Vol. 42

claimants to vindicate their statutory rights? Answers to these questions
depend on an examination of the most likely forums to hear small claims,
both of which are options available to the Concepcions: small claims court
and small claims arbitration.
III. FORUMS FOR SMALL CLAIMS
Because   the   Concepcions’   arbitration   agreement   with   AT&T   had   a  
small claims court optional carve out (as do some consumer pre-dispute
arbitration clauses), allowing them to opt out of arbitration and pursue their
dispute in small claims court, they could elect to proceed with their $30.22
claim in small claims court in California.57 This section of the article
explores the origins and process of small claims courts.
A. Small Claims Court
The need for a simple and efficient mechanism for the resolution of
garden-variety, low dollar value disputes has plagued the Anglo-American
justice system for centuries, dating back to the creation of a small debt court
in England in 1606.58 In the early twentieth century, legal scholars began to
recognize the inability of the American court system to handle the volume
and type of litigation produced by rapidly growing cities.59 They identified
procedural technicalities as the cause of high costs and delays in the
administration of justice, which prevented ordinary citizens from accessing
the courts.60 They sought to streamline due process to give wage earners
access to the courts.61 Roscoe Pound wrote:
[a] . . . problem is to make adequate provision for petty litigation, to
provide for disposing quickly, inexpensively, and justly of litigation of the
poor, for the collection of debts in a shifting population, and for the great
general unconscionability principles. Id. at *4. The court concluded that, while it was “on the low
end of the spectrum of procedural unconscionability,” it was not substantively unconscionable.
Id. Thus, the court ordered Vincent and Liza Concepcion to arbitrate their claims according to the
terms of the December 2006 version of the arbitration agreement (which the parties agreed was
the controlling version). Id. at *5.
57. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. Some arbitration forums have required small claims
court carve-outs as part of their Consumer Due Process Protocols. E.g., Consumer Due Process
Protocol, AAA, Principle 5 (Apr. 17, 1998), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer?
(follow “Consumer Due Process Protocol” hyperlink) (“Consumer ADR Agreements should make
it clear that all parties retain the right to seek relief in a small claims court for disputes or claims
within the scope of its jurisdiction.”).
58. Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 223.
59. Id. at 221.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 221-22.
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volume of small controversies which a busy, crowded population,
diversified in race and language, necessarily engenders. It is here that the
administration of justice touches immediately the greatest number of
62
people.”

This scholarship led to debates and proposals about ways to reform the
justice system.63 Discussions   centered   around   the   concept   of   “informal  
justice,”   which   recognizes   the   need   to   offer   disputants   “simplified  
procedures, reduced costs and delay, limitations on the right [to] appeal,
and,  above  all,  the  chance  to  appear  in  court  without  a  lawyer”  to  air  their  
low dollar value grievances.64 Policymakers stressed the importance for a
new   forum   to   be   without   the   “formal   civil   adjudicative   process,   [which]  
was so complex, cumbersome, and expensive that it had become largely
unusable by wage-earners or small business men who had wages or
accounts to collect that were too small to justify the expense and delay of a
formal  civil  proceeding.”65
The first small claims court in the United States was established in
Cleveland, Ohio in 1913.66 A   short   time   later,   “the   first   statutory   small  
debtor’s   court   began   operating   in   Kansas.”67 The small claims court
movement in the United States gained momentum in the 1920s and 1930s,
with more and more states setting up small claims courts as an adjunct to
their regular court systems.68 Small claims courts emerged throughout the
United States, some by rule of court and others by statute.69
For example, the present day New York City Small Claims Court
originated in 1917 with a series of rules created by the Justices of the
Municipal Court of the City of New York to allow for arbitration and
conciliation.70 Due to continued delays in the City Court of New York that
ranged from two to four years,71 in 1934, the legislature established a Small
62. Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 302,
315 (1913).
63. Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 223.
64. John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 24 (1990).
65. Christopher J. Whelan, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 5 (1990).
66. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 224; Alexander Domanskis, Small Claims
Courts: An Overview and Recommendation, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 590, 591 (1976).
67. Domanskis, supra note 66, at 591.
68. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 223-24.
69. Domanskis, supra note 66, at 591-92.
70. Debra Ruth Wolin, How to Defeat the Jurisdiction (and Purpose) of Small Claims Court
For Only Fifteen Dollars, 44 BROOK. L. REV. 431, 431 (1978).
71. These delays caused then Governor Lehman to declare “that such delays in effect
amounted to a denial of justice.” ‘Poor Man’s Court’ Urged by Lehman; 7 Reforms Asked, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1934, at 1.
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Claims Part of the Municipal Court which is still an integral part of the
court today.72 This court has been regarded as one of the most effective
small claims court in the country due to convenient features such as holding
evening sessions to accommodate working people, prohibiting the use of
the court by corporations, businesses, and assignees, and establishing a
local neighborhood court to serve the community.73
The United States’ small claims court model initially had five major
components: (1) court costs were minimized; (2) pleadings were simplified;
(3) trial judges had discretion in fashioning trial procedures, and rules of
evidence were eliminated; (4) representation by counsel was not needed
because judges and court clerks were expected to assist litigants both in trial
preparation and at trial; and (5) judges could direct judgments to be paid in
installments.74 The initial model was modified in response to the consumer
advocacy movement of the 1960s to bar collection agencies as plaintiffs and
ban attorneys from appearing on behalf of either party.75
Today, every state in the country has some form of a small claims
court.76 While the jurisdictional amount varies by state or municipality,
typically small claims courts hear claims of under $10,000 in damages.77
Filing fees are modest.78 The process also varies by state, but most systems
72. New York City Civil Court Small Claims Part, Civil Court History, NEW YORK STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/smallclaims/civilhistory.shtml (last
visited Sept. 19, 2012).
73. Id.; Davis v. City of New York, 148 Misc.2d 422, 423. (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1990); U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, MODEL CONSUMER JUSTICE ACT: A PROPOSED MODEL SMALL CLAIMS
COURT ACT FOR STATE LEGISLATURES 45 (1976). In 1991, a separate commercial small claims
division was created to serve corporations and businesses. New York City Civil Court Small
Claims Part, Civil Court History, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/smallclaims/civilhistory.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
74. Whelan, supra note 65, at 5.
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. Bruce Zucker & Monica Herr, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003); Domanskis, supra
note 66, at 591.
77. For example, in California and Illinois, small claims courts hear claims up to $10,000,
and in New York City and North Carolina the damages cap is $5,000. See, e.g., Basics,
CALIFORNIA COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/1256.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012); Small
Claims Court, ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://www.ag.state.il.us/consumers/smlclaims.
html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012); New York City Civil Court Small Claims Part, NEW YORK
STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/smallclaims/general.shtml
(last visited Sept. 19, 2012); About Small Claims Court, THE NORTH CAROLINA COURT SYSTEM,
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/Trial/Sclaims/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
78. For example, California charges a $30 filing fee (up to $75 for larger claims); New York
City charges a $15-$25 filing fee depending on the type of claimant and the size of the claim. See
Basics, CALIFORNIA COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/1256.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012);
Jonathan Lippman et al., Your Guide to Small Claims and Commercial Small Claims, NEW YORK
STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/civil/pdfs/
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share the characteristics of a face-to-face interaction with a judge, and a
rapid oral hearing at which the parties can present witnesses and
documents.79 Parties are rarely represented by a lawyer, and some courts
even bar them.80
Litigant challenges to the small claims court model have fallen short.81
Virtually all courts that have considered constitutional due process
challenges to small claims court have rejected them.82 As one lower court
stated,  “[t]his  is  a  system  which  balances  the  poor  litigant’s  right  to  a  day  in  
court, with the constitutional right of defendants not to be deprived of
property  without  due  process  of  law.”83 The Supreme Court of California
traced the history of small claims court back to England and concluded that
it  was  rooted  in  the  common  law  to  “provide  practical,  useful  remedies for
persons   with   very   small   claims.”84 As a result, because the constitutional
right to a jury trial exists only to the extent it existed at common law at the
time  of  the  state  constitution’s  adoption,  the  court  reasoned  that  there  is  no  
right to a jury trial for small claims.85
Scholars note that small claims courts provide a sense of procedural
justice by treating litigants with respect, giving them an opportunity to be
heard by an impartial decision-maker, and providing them with an
opportunity to tell their side of the story.86 “A  belief  in  the  trustworthiness  
of officials is perhaps the strongest contributor to a perception of procedural
fairness. . . . Trustworthiness also is enhanced to the extent that judges
explain to defendants the basis for their  decisions.”87
On the other hand, small claims courts have been subject to much
scrutiny for failing to achieve their original goal of making courts more

smallclaims.pdf. Obviously, it is not cost-effective for a litigant to bring a claim that is smaller
than the filing fees. Ironically, the Concepcions’ $30.22 damages claim in California exceeds the
filing fee by twenty-two cents. So at least a full recovery wouldn’t occur at a loss.
79. Crouchman v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Cal. 1988).
80. Whelan, supra note 65, at 11.
81. See, e.g., Crouchman, 755 P.2d at 1075-76.
82. See, e.g., id. at 1077 (concluding that there is no constitutional or statutory right to a jury
trial “at any point in a small claims proceeding.”).
83. City & County of San Francisco v. Small Claims Court, 190 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (Ct.
App. 1983).
84. Crouchman, 755 P.2d at 1080.
85. Id. at 1080-81.
86. David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized
Courts (and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, 37 CT. REV. 22, 26 (2000).
87. Id. at 26-27 (“It has been suggested . . . that small claims courts ‘probably work a
therapeutic effect, at least when black-robed judges take the time to listen to plaintiffs and
defendants explain their sides of a dispute.’”)   (citation   omitted);; see also Zucker & Herr, supra
note 76, at 324.
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accessible to people of modest means with modest claims. 88 One influential
article from 1975 questioned the basic premise of small claims courts that
low  dollar  value  claims  are  inherently  “simple.”89 The authors questioned
the effectiveness of small claims proceedings to hear even basic fraud
claims, and suggested, ironically enough, increased use of arbitration and
mediation as an adjunct to the small claims court.90 Small claims courts
also have been chastised for, among other things, being collection agencies,
issuing numerous default judgments, issuing unenforceable judgments,
allotting insufficient time for litigants to present their cases due to court
congestion and other time constraints, favoring, in some instances, the selfrepresented and, in others, favoring those represented by an attorney, and
failing to publicize the court.91
While dispute systems designers generally view small claims courts as
effective,92 their drawbacks could prompt the Concepcions to choose not to
exercise their small claims opt-out right. Their only other option is to
proceed with small claims arbitration.93 The next section of the article
describes that process.
B. Small Claims Arbitration in Commercial Forums
Virtually every major arbitration forum prescribes a small claims
arbitration process for any arbitration case in which the claimant seeks
damages below a certain threshold, and that process varies from the default
arbitration process for commercial disputes.94

88. See Robert J. Hollingsworth et al., Note, The Ohio Small Claims Court: An Empirical
Study, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 469, 469-70 (1973); Judicial Reform at the Lowest Level: A Model
Statute for Small Claims Courts, 28 VAND. L. REV. 711, 723-729 (1975) (studying the
deficiencies of small claims courts); Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 236, 240.
89. Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 225-26.
90. Id. at 258-61.
91. Id. at 228-29; see also Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, Contemporary
Studies Project: The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433,
441-51 (1990).
92. Elwell & Carlson, supra note 91, at 434, 446, 452.
93. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
94. E.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AAA, Rule E-1 to E-10
(June 1, 2010), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer? (follow “Commercial Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedures” hyperlink).
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American Arbitration Association95

Pursuant   to   Rule   1   of   the   AAA’s   Commercial   Arbitration   Rules,  
“Expedited   Procedures” are   employed   when   no   party’s   claim exceeds
$75,000, exclusive of costs and interest, or when the parties agree.96
However, the Expedited Procedures will not apply in disputes involving
more than two parties, unless the parties agree otherwise.97 Rule E-6 of the
Expedited Procedures provides that if no party brings a claim of more than
$10,000 (exclusive of interest and costs), or if the parties agree, the dispute
will be resolved on the written submissions.98 However, the parties have
the right to request an oral hearing, and the arbitrator may also determine
that such a hearing is necessary.99
To assist the parties and neutrals in fashioning procedures for paper
cases,   the   AAA   has   established   Guidelines   for   Written   Arbitration,   “as a
suggested method for resolving disputes by submission of documents.”100
The   Guidelines   caution   the   parties   that   “the   arbitrator may amend these
procedures   by   the   parties’   agreement   or   at   the   arbitrator’s   initiative   based  
on   the   unique   needs   of   each   case.”101 Under   the   Guidelines,   “the   parties  
submit in writing to the AAA any documents pertaining to the arbitration,
including a statement of facts together with any briefs, written arguments or
other  evidence  they  wish  to  submit.”102 Each party is given a right to one
95. The AAA “is a not-for-profit organization with offices throughout the U.S. AAA has a
long history and experience in the field of alternative dispute resolution, providing services to
individuals and organizations who wish to resolve conflicts out of court.” About American
Arbitration Association, AAA, http://www.adr.org/ (follow “About” hyperlink) (last visited Sept.
19, 2012).
96. Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AAA, Rule R-1(b) (June 1,
2010), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer? (follow “Commercial Arbitration Rules
and Mediation Procedures” hyperlink) (“Unless the parties or the AAA determines otherwise, the
Expedited Procedures shall apply in any case in which no disclosed claim or counterclaim exceeds
$75,000, exclusive of interest and arbitration fees and costs. Parties may also agree to use these
procedures in larger cases. Unless the parties agree otherwise, these procedures will not apply in
cases involving more than two parties. The Expedited Procedures shall be applied as described in
Sections E-1 through E-10 of these rules, in addition to any other portion of these rules that is not
in conflict with the Expedited Procedures.”).
97. Id.
98. Id. Rule E-6.
99. Id. (“Where no party’s claim exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and arbitration costs,
and other cases in which the parties agree, the dispute shall be resolved by submission of
documents, unless any party requests an oral hearing, or the arbitrator determines that an oral
hearing is necessary. The arbitrator shall establish a fair and equitable procedure for the
submission of documents.”).
100. Guidelines for Written Arbitration, AAA, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/
consumer? (follow “Guidelines for Written Arbitration” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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reply submission, due fourteen days after the initial submission.103 The
AAA  then  transmits  all  of  the  parties’  written  submissions  to  the  arbitrator  
for a decision within fourteen days.104
The   AAA’s   Consumer   Due   Process   Protocol   also   addresses   paper  
cases.105 Principle   12   provides,   “[i]n some cases, such as some small
claims, the requirement of fundamental fairness may be met by hearings
conducted by electronic or telephonic means or by a submission of
documents. However, the Neutral should have discretionary authority to
require a face-to-face hearing upon  the  request  of  a  party.”106 To implement
this principle in the consumer dispute context, AAA has enacted
supplementary procedures.107 These procedures clarify that, for claims of
$10,000 or less, the dispute will be resolved through Desk Arbitration,
unless either party or the arbitrator requests a hearing.108 As to Desk
Arbitration   procedures,   the   AAA   simply   states   that   “[t]he   arbitrator   will  
establish  a  fair  process  for  submitting  the  documents.”109
Finally, under these supplementary procedures, the AAA allocates the
cost burden to the business rather than the consumer.110 Thus, under the fee
schedule effective January 1, 2010, the consumer pays a maximum fee of
only  $125  for  a  Desk  Arbitration,  and  it  is  refunded  if  “not  used”  to  pay  the  
arbitrator.111 In contrast, the business pays $775 for a Desk Arbitration and
a  “Case  Service  Fee”  of  $200  if  a  hearing  is  held.112
2.

JAMS

Like   the   AAA,   JAMS   (which   claims   to   be   “the   largest private
alternative   dispute   resolution   (“ADR”)   provider   in   the   world”)113 has a
separate set of Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures for smaller

103. Id.
104. Id. Before deciding, the arbitrator can “request further evidence from any party(s), if
necessary.” Id.
105. Consumer Due Process Protocol, AAA, Principle 12 (Apr. 17, 1998), http://www.adr.
org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer? (follow “Consumer Due Process Protocol” hyperlink).
106. Id.
107. Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures, AAA (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer? (follow “Supplementary Procedures for
Consumer-Related Disputes” hyperlink).
108. Id. Rule C-5.
109. Id.
110. See id. Rule C-8.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. About JAMS, JAMS: THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS, http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus (last
visited Sept. 19, 2012).
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claims, although the monetary cap is much higher at JAMS.114 These rules
are used when the parties agree or when no claim or counterclaim exceeds
$250,000, excluding interests and costs.115 Both sets of rules contain a
provision for an award based on written submissions (Rule 18 in the
Streamlined Rules116 and Rule 23 in the Comprehensive Rules).117 The
wording   in   both   is   identical:   “[t]he   Parties   may   agree   to   waive   the   oral  
Hearing and submit the dispute to the Arbitrator for an Award based on
written  submissions  and  other  evidence  as  the  Parties  may  agree.”118
3.

FINRA

The securities industry has been utilizing arbitration as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism for both intra-industry and customer-broker
disputes since the 1800s.119 Today,   virtually   all   customers’   disputes   with  
their brokers are administered by FINRA Dispute Resolution.120
It   wasn’t   until   the   1970s   that   the   industry   focused   on   designing   an  
arbitration procedure specifically to administer   investors’   small   claims.121
As I have previously written:

114. JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures, JAMS: THE RESOLUTION
EXPERTS, Rule 1 (July 15, 2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/.
115. Id. If the dispute exceeds this amount, JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and
Procedures are used. JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures, JAMS: THE
RESOLUTION EXPERTS, Rule 1 (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensivearbitration/.
116. JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures, JAMS: THE RESOLUTION
EXPERTS, Rule 18 (July 15, 2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/.
117. JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures, JAMS: THE RESOLUTION
EXPERTS, Rule 23 (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
118. Compare id., with JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures, JAMS: THE
RESOLUTION EXPERTS, Rule 18 (July 15, 2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-streamlinedarbitration/.
119. See Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329, 336 (2006).
120. Arbitration and Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
index.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012). Until mid-2007, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) ran separate arbitration
forums that handled a combined 99% of all securities arbitrations in the country; but on July 30,
2007, NASD and NYSE, including their respective arbitration forums, consolidated and formed
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). NASD and NYSE Member Regulation
Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority—FINRA, FINRA (July 30, 2007),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329. FINRA now “operates the largest
dispute resolution forum in the securities industry.” Arbitration and Mediation, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/index.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
121. Jill I. Gross & Stefanie Shabman, A Primer on FINRA Simplified Arbitration in
SECURITIES ARBITRATION IN THE MARKET MELTDOWN ERA: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS IN
PERCEPTION AND REALITY 351, 351 (2009).
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[i]n April 1977, the Securities and Exchange Commission established the
Securities   Industry   Conference   on   Arbitration   (“SICA”),   comprised   of  
representatives of various securities self-regulatory organizations, the
public, and the Securities Industry Association . . . to develop a uniform
arbitration code and the means for establishing a more efficient, economic,
and appropriate mechanism for resolving investor disputes involving small
sums of money.
SICA was charged with the responsibility of
promulgating a plan which allowed the self regulatory organizations to
provide a public customer with a relatively simple procedure for resolving
disputes without the aid of an attorney or the need to appear at a hearing.
The proposed plan, which applied to claims of damages of $2,500 or less,
provided that the arbitrator will decide the dispute on the basis of the
documents submitted, unless the customer requests a hearing or the
arbitrator believes that a hearing is necessary or appropriate.
To initiate the arbitration, a claimant was required to file a single
typewritten or printed letter explaining the basis of the claim and to pay a
$25 filing fee. . . . Within one year of the issuance of the 1977 SICA
Report, ten stock exchanges and two self-regulatory organizations
(“SROs”)  adopted  these  procedures.
In 1978, SICA first proposed its Uniform Code of Arbitration to
provide a model code of arbitration procedure for securities arbitrations
taking place at the various stock exchanges and SROs. This proposed
Uniform Code included the small claims procedures . . . and was adopted
by the participating exchanges and SROs in 1979 and 1980. By 1980,
SICA reported that on the basis of the number of small claims arbitrations
received as well as the speed with which they are resolved it would appear
122
that the Small Claims Procedure has been a great success.

Since 1979, SICA has raised the dollar value threshold for a dispute to
qualify for simplified arbitration four times, the most recent of which took
place in 2012, when FINRA obtained SEC approval to raise the limit to
$50,000, exclusive of interest and expenses.123 Today, Rule 12800 of
FINRA’s  Code  of  Arbitration  Procedure  for  Customer  Disputes  codifies the
simplified   arbitration   process,   which   remains   consistent   with   SICA’s  
original  streamlined  approach  to  resolving  customers’  low  value  disputes.124

122. Id. at 351-52 (2009) (original alterations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id.; Securities and Exchange Commission, Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change
Raising the Limit for Simplified Arbitration from $25,000 to $50,000, 77 Fed. Reg. 27262 (May
9, 2012). The jurisdictional cap is codified in FINRA Customer Code, Rule 12800(a). FINRA
Customer Code, supra note 7, Rule 12800(a).
124. FINRA Customer Code, supra note 7, Rule 12800(a).
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Under Rule 12800, a single public arbitrator, who is FINRA Chairqualified,  decides  the  parties’  dispute, unless the parties agree otherwise.125
“Simultaneous   with   and   after   arbitrator   selection,   the   parties   may   request  
documents  and  other  information  from  each  other.”126 “The  arbitrator  holds  
no live hearings unless a customer [or the arbitrator] requests one. . . . The
arbitrator bases the award on the pleadings and other materials submitted by
the parties. FINRA pays the arbitrator an honorarium of $125 for each case
administered  under  this  rule.”127
4.

Advantages of Simplified Arbitrations

Simplified arbitrations have numerous advantages to parties when
compared to arbitrations with live hearings. Turnaround time is faster than
non-simplified cases because pre-hearing conferences or live hearings are
not needed, and the parties typically spend less time on discovery and
motions.128 Process costs are also lower because only one arbitrator, not
three, hears the dispute, and the parties generally do not incur forum fees
stemming from pre-hearing conferences (unless requested by one party) and
evidentiary hearing sessions.129 In addition, because filing fees are based on
the amount in dispute, fees for simplified cases are lower.130 Parties also
avoid costs typically associated with extensive discovery as well as inperson appearances by third-party witnesses and experts.131 As I previously
posited:
simplified arbitration . . . provides access to justice for pro se claimants, as
well as the elderly and disabled. These claimants may be unable or
unwilling to pursue their [meritorious low dollar value] claims if they had
the burden of traveling to a hearing [location], testifying in person against
a broker [or a company salesperson], or arguing the facts and the law to [a
132
professional] arbitrator [who may be intimidating to them].

125. Gross & Shabman, supra note 121, at 353.
126. Id. at 354 (original alterations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 353-54 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
128. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAnd
Mediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last updated Sept. 19,
2012). For example, for simplified decisions, recent turnaround times were 6.4 months in 2010,
6.3 months in 2011, and 7.4 months in 2012 (through August). For awards after a live hearing, the
turnaround time was substantially longer: 14.7 months in 2010, 15.8 months in 2011, and 16.8
months in 2012 (through August). Id.
129. Gross & Shabman, supra note 121, at 356.
130. Id. at 355.
131. Id. at 356.
132. Id. at 356 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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Disadvantages of Paper Hearings

Paper hearings also have some disadvantages. Since documentary
evidence usually is the strongest proof of commercial transactions, the
process disadvantages the party who has access to fewer documents.133 It
has been my experience that, typically, consumers or customers do not have
copies of their own documents, including customer agreements, account
statements, bills, invoices, etc. Furthermore, I have observed that these
documents need testimonial proof when they do not exist. However, in
simplified arbitrations where witness testimony is submitted only via
affidavit,   “an   arbitrator   may   find   it   difficult   to   assess   the   credibility   [or  
veracity] of a witness without oral testimony and the benefit of crossexamination.”134 Furthermore, basic commercial arbitrator training courses
do  not  cover  paper  arbitrations,  “leaving  a  less-experienced arbitrator with
little   guidance   as   to   how   to   decide   cases   based   on   paper   submissions.” 135
Parties are less likely to have legal representation in small claims
arbitration, yet I would argue that legal representation is even more needed
because of the decision-maker’s   reliance   on   writings.      Absent   a   lawyer’s  
unique ability to present facts and law persuasively, an arbitrator may have
a hard time parsing through the facts and claims as presented by a nonlawyer.136
Moreover, in a customer or consumer dispute, not requiring a personal
appearance from a representative of the party with the stronger bargaining
power, such as the brokerage house or consumer services company, may
deter settlement.137 Also,  many  claimants  seek  their  “day  in  court”  so  they  
can tell their story and be heard.138 In fact, academic research shows that
participants perceive a dispute resolution process as more fair if they
believe they have been heard.139 If a claimant requests an in-person
hearing, the claimant will then lose the advantages of speed and cost.140 In
the end, under the current system design, being heard in person may prove
too costly for small dollar value disputants.141

133. Id. at 357.
134. Id. at 356.
135. Id.
136. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (stating that “written submissions
do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his
argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important.”).
137. Gross & Shabman, supra note 121, at 356.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 356-57.
140. Id. at 357.
141. Id.
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Given some of this criticism, parties have, on occasion, challenged the
fairness and/or validity of the simplified arbitration process.142 The next
section of the article explores how the courts have ruled on these various
challenges.
IV. COURTS’ ENDORSEMENT OF SIMPLIFIED ARBITRATION
As noted above, the Supreme Court, through decades of FAA
decisions, has held that the FAA establishes a strong national policy
favoring arbitration.143 Legal challenges to the process of arbitration face
many hurdles, as courts are eager to enforce arbitration agreements, and the
recognized grounds to challenge awards are very narrow.144 While several
legal doctrines serve to police the fairness of arbitration, recent court
decisions have rendered them more and more toothless.145
Before Congress enacted the FAA, the federal common law of this
country, while acknowledging the general principle that courts should
intervene   only   sparingly   in   arbitration   matters,   imposed   a   “fundamental  
fairness”   requirement   on   commercial   arbitration.146 However, the FAA
does not contain   or   mention   the   words   “fair”   or   “fairness”   because   it   is  
primarily a procedural gap-filling statute.147 The only reference to a
“hearing”  is  found  in  FAA  section  10(a)(3),  which  provides  that  the  court  
can   vacate   an   award   “where   the   arbitrators   were   guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
144. Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (tolerating only
“limited re-view [] to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway”).
Section 10 of the FAA provides the sole grounds on which a court can set aside or vacate an
arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2010). These grounds focus on the arbitration process, not
the merits and judicial review of arbitration awards under these grounds is extremely narrow. See
Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s In Charge?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 152-53,
168 (2010).
145. See Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 495-96 (2008).
146. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349-50 (1854) (confirming award in a
commercial dispute between a retailer and two wholesalers and stating that “after a full and fair
hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact”);
Citizens Bldg. of W. Palm Beach, Inc., v. Western Union Tel. Co., 120 F.2d 982, 984 (5th Cir.
1941) (“The universal rule in common-law arbitrations is that the parties are entitled to be heard,
after reasonable notice, upon the subject matter in dispute.”). See generally Gross, McMahon
Turns Twenty, supra note 145, at 503-08. Courts reasoned that, if asked to set aside an arbitration
award, the court was sitting in equity, and no court of equity could deny relief from a proceeding
demonstrated to be fundamentally unfair. Burchell, 58 U.S. at 349-50.
147. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-16 (2006). FAA Sections 3-16 largely specify procedures for
enforcing arbitration agreements and awards in the federal courts. See id.
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refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.”148
As a result, after the passage of the FAA, courts struggled to balance
the common law need for fairness with the plain meaning of the FAA,
which did not appear to mandate sufficient hallmarks of fairness and private
due process.149 Some early post-FAA courts continued to impose the
common law fairness requirement on arbitration hearings arising out of
FAA-governed contracts.150 More recently, courts seem to have reached a
consensus that an arbitration hearing arising under the FAA must include
the classic hallmarks of fairness: notice, a right to be heard, and a neutral
decision-maker.151 Thus, courts have vacated awards where the arbitrators
refused to hear pertinent evidence152 or barred testimony of a witness.153

148. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).
149. Compare Seldner Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 22 F. Supp. 388, 391-92 (D. Md. 1938)
(concluding that Congress did not intend to abandon essential safeguards absent clear language in
the FAA to the contrary), with Catz Am. Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exchange, Inc., 292 F. Supp.
549, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (recognizing courts’ “limited” role in reviewing an arbitral award so as
not to frustrate the objectives of the FAA in promoting arbitration as a means of “reduc[ing] cost
and delay frequently encountered in the courts”).
150. E.g., Seldner Corp., 22 F. Supp. at 391-92 (vacating award due to lack of notice and
opportunity to be heard and noting that these requirements deeply ingrained in English and
American jurisprudence, and absence of these essential safeguards in the FAA did not indicate
Congressional intent to abolish them in the arbitral setting).
151. See Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012–13 (10th Cir.
1994) (gathering cases). Cf. Sroka Family LLC v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 176 Fed. App’x 766, 767
(9th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s dismissal of petition to vacate securities arbitration
award due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “review of the fairness of arbitration
proceedings does not involve a substantial question of federal law where petitioners were not
denied adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence and an impartial decision by the arbitrator.”).
152. E.g., Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas
Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1985) (vacating award for arbitrator’s refusal to hear material
evidence constituting misconduct); LJL 33rd St. Associates v. Pitcairn Properties, Inc., No. 11
Civ. 6399(JSR), 2012 WL 613498, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (same); Bell Packaging Corp.
v. Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union Local 415-S, No. 98 C 4316, 1998 WL 748270, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 22, 1998) (vacating award for fundamental unfairness where arbitrator allowed new
allegation to be raised during hearing); Dover Elevator Sys., Inc. v. United Steel Workers of Am.,
No. 2:97CV101-B-B, 1998 WL 527290, at *2 (N.D. Miss. July 2, 1998) (vacating award because
arbitrator acted in a “fundamentally unfair” manner by preventing party from submitting rebuttal
evidence); Home Indemnity Co. v. Affiliated Food Distribs., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 9707(RO), 1997
WL 773712, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 12, 1997) (vacating award because “touchstone” of fundamental
fairness was absent in arbitrator’s decision). Some states’ arbitration law also permits vacatur of
an award where the arbitrator refused to hear material evidence. See, e.g., Burlage v. Super. Ct.,
100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 531, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2009).
153. E.g., Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (vacating award
for  arbitrator’s refusal to postpone hearings so as to allow a material witness to testify); Kaplan v.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 0258 (JFK), 1996 WL 640901, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
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At the same time, courts give wide latitude to arbitrators in meeting
these fairness hallmarks and require nothing more. Courts have approved
the fairness of telephonic hearings in lieu of in-person hearings.154 Indeed,
the  FAA’s  reference  to  a  “hearing”  does  not  require  that  a  hearing  be  live,  
and courts approve arbitral resolutions of disputes based solely on paper
submissions.155 For example, in Air Florida System, where the only issue
decided by the arbitrator was a business valuation, the Ninth Circuit held
that:
the failure to hold an oral hearing cannot be deemed misbehavior that
prejudiced   the   FDIC’s   rights   because   the   FDIC   has   not   shown   that   its  
evidence was not amenable to presentation in written form. Admittedly, a
‘paper  hearing’  often   will  be   an  inadequate   means to determine the facts
upon which an arbitration decision must rely. In this case, however, the
nature   of   the   decision   to   be   made   leads   us   to   conclude   that   the   ‘paper  
156
hearing’  was  adequate.

Additionally, courts find that arbitrators have the authority to decide prehearing motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions, as long as the
arbitrator’s   refusal   to   hold   a   full   evidentiary   hearing   is   not   fundamentally  
unfair.157
1996); Harvey Aluminum v. United Steelworkers of Am., 263 F. Supp. 488, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1967)
(vacating award under 10(a)(3) for refusal to hear testimony of a rebuttal witness).
154. Knight v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 350 Fed. App’x 119, 120 (9th Cir.
2009) (concluding that “[t]he arbitration panel did not exceed its authority in determining the
manner in which it conducted the hearings on [claimant’s] claims”); Berkley v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1:06CV606, 2008 WL 755875, *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2008)
(“Because Plaintiffs responded to the motions to dismiss and participated in oral arguments at the
telephonic hearing, this Court cannot find that Plaintiffs were denied fundamental fairness.”).
155. E.g., FDIC v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that paper
hearing can, in certain cases, satisfy the FAA); Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th
Cir. 1971) (arbitration does not require an evidentiary hearing); Intercarbon Bermuda, Ltd. v.
Caltex Trading & Transp. Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (paper hearing is
fundamentally fair); see also Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 149 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“A ‘hearing’ means any confrontation, oral or otherwise, between an affected individual and an
agency decisionmaker [sic] sufficient to allow the individual to present his case in a meaningful
manner. Hearings may take many forms, including a ‘formal,’ trial-type proceeding, an ‘informal
discuss[ion]’ . . . or a ‘paper hearing,’ without any opportunity for oral exchange.”) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
156. Air Fla. Sys., 822 F.2d at 842.
157. E.g., Wise v. Wachovia Sec. LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of
motion to vacate award where arbitrators granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment
before a live hearing); Vento v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 128 Fed. App’x 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2005)
(stating that “we hold that a NASD arbitration panel has full authority to grant a pre-hearing
motion to dismiss with prejudice based solely on the parties’ pleadings”); Sheldon v. Vermonty,
269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001); Campbell v. Am. Family Life Assur. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d
1114, 1119-21 (D. Minn. 2009); Tricome v. Success Trade Sec., No. 05-4746, 2006 WL 1451502,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2006) (denying motion to vacate arbitrators’ pre-hearing dismissal); Allen
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In the few reported cases arising out of simplified or desk
arbitrations,158 lower courts have held that the procedure is fundamentally
fair.159 For example, in Papayiannis v. Zelin, the court confirmed the
simplified arbitration award and found the procedure was fair where the
losing party had ample notice of, as well as an opportunity to participate in,
the arbitration.160 However,   in   these   cases,   the   courts’   analysis   is   quite  
cursory, with only a few sentences dedicated to the summary conclusion
that the procedures are fair.161 None of the cases reflect a detailed analysis
of the procedural shortcuts of a document-only arbitration and the impact of
those shortcuts on the fairness of the process.162
v. RBC Dain Rauscher, Inc., No. C06-5163 RJB, 2006 WL 1303119, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 9,
2006) (refusing to vacate arbitrators’ pre-hearing dismissal); Warren v. Tacher, 114 F. Supp. 2d
600, 602–03 (W.D. Ky. 2000); Max Marx Color & Chem., v. Barnes, 37 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250–51
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognizing authority of NASD arbitrators to grant pre-hearing dismissal);
Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 58 F. Supp. 2d 212, 219–20 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that
“arbitrators are not compelled to conduct oral hearings in every case”); Reinglass v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No. 86407, 2006 WL 802751, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006)
(confirming award where the panel dismissed the investor’s claims on ground that claimant failed
to plead fraud with the specificity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)); Patton v. J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co., No. 104939/04, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3135, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug.
23, 2004) (denying motion to vacate award that dismissed arbitration claim without a hearing,
finding that such a dismissal does not deny a party fundamental fairness when arbitrator
determines there is no relevant or material evidence to present at a hearing). Contra Prudential
Sec. Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1418 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (vacating award as fundamentally
unfair where panel granted summary judgment denying a party an opportunity to present material
evidence).
158. It is not surprising that there are so few reported cases in light of how little money is at
stake, by definition. The costs of challenging the award would likely outweigh the value of even a
full recovery.
159. E.g., Roberts v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. B-06-17, 2007 WL 597371, at *9–10
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2007) (granting motion to confirm NYSE simplified arbitration award and
expressly concluding that simplified arbitration procedures were “fundamentally fair” under the
FAA); Dicalite Armenia, Inc. v. Progress Bulk Carriers, Ltd., No. 04 Civ. 9241(RCC), 2006 WL
453216, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2006) (rejecting party’s claim that a complex claim about cargo
damage could not be arbitrated in simplified arbitration); Bolick v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-CV-4532, 2006 WL 229038, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2006)
(confirming $4,000 simplified arbitration award despite claimant’s allegations of arbitrator bias
and fraud); Papayiannis v. Zelin, 205 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (confirming award
arising out of NASD simplified arbitration procedure and rejecting losing party’s claim that he
had no opportunity to be heard); Warehall v. Pasternak, No. 92 Civ. 9227 (PKL), 1993 WL
437784, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1993) (confirming NASD simplified arbitration award and
finding that simplified arbitration rules provide ample opportunity to be heard); McLaughlin,
Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 55, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (confirming simplified arbitration
award and approving paper hearing). But see Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 234,
237 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding “desk” arbitration process with no opportunity to present witnesses
“suffers from serious unfairness”), rev’d on other grounds, 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir. 1997).
160. 205 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
161. See, e.g., id.
162. See, e.g., id.
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One other doctrine could be used to challenge the fairness of small
claims arbitration. If small claims disputants can show that they cannot
vindicate their statutory rights in simplified arbitration because the forums
do not provide an economically feasible opportunity for a live hearing, they
could convince a court not to enforce the arbitration agreement.163 For
claims less than the minimum filing fee, it does not seem viable or sensible
for a claimant to go forward. However, some arbitration forums cap fees a
consumer must pay in small claims arbitration at only a few hundred dollars
(e.g., in AAA, no more than $125 for claims under $10,000).164 Some
companies, like AT&T, provide in their pre-dispute arbitration clauses that
they  will  pay  a  consumer’s  fee  if  he  or  she  decides  to  go  forward  with  small  
claims arbitration.165 Also, many ADR forums will waive their filing fees
upon a showing of financial hardship.166 Thus, it may be difficult for
consumer claimants to argue that they could not vindicate their statutory
rights due to the costs of the forum.167
V. IS SMALL CLAIMS ARBITRATION FAIR?
Given that the few courts that have addressed the fairness of simplified
arbitration conducted a cursory analysis, and required only minimal indicia
of due process,168 it is worth revisiting whether the current model of small
claims arbitration—a document-based process—is fair. Fairness can be
measured, among other ways, substantively (distributive justice) and
procedurally (procedural justice).169 A process is substantively fair if
equally situated disputants receive equal outcomes.170 However, measuring
outcomes of arbitration is virtually impossible because awards are often not

163. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 106-112 and accompanying text.
165. Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, § 2.2(c), http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/
articles-resources/wireless-terms.jsp (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
166. FINRA Customer Code, supra note 7, Rule 12900(a)(1).
167. Several courts have rejected challenges to arbitration clauses on precisely this basis. See,
e.g., Siebert v. Amateur Athletic Union of the U.S., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1043 (D. Minn.
2006) (plaintiffs’ failure to seek fee waiver or consider desk arbitration negates their claim that
arbitration costs render the arbitration clause substantively unconscionable); In re Universal Serv.
Fund Tel. Billing Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1138 (D. Kan. 2003); Ragan v. AT&T Corp., 824
N.E.2d 1183, 1196-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
168. See, e.g., supra note 158-162 and accompanying text.
169. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 23, at 1666 (defining
substantive, or distributive, justice).
170. Id. (stating that “[i]f a single party or group were to win all disputes, if equally situated
persons received disparate results, or if the ‘justice’ system led to increasingly unequal division of
resources, few if any of us would feel that justice had been served.”).

2.GROSS.MACRO.10.29.12 (DO NOT DELETE)

72

S OU TH WES TER N LA W REVIE W

11/26/2012 12:53 PM

[Vol. 42

published, and even if they are, they do not include analysis of fact and law
to enable the necessary comparisons.171
The only empirical study of which I am aware that attempts to measure
the substantive fairness of small claims arbitration was published by the
Securities Arbitration Commentator in 2009.172 In that survey, the author
reported   the   “win   rates”173 of small claims arbitration in FINRA Dispute
Resolution from 2002-2008 and compared them to   the   “win   rates”   of  
“Customer/Member   Awards,”   where   “claim   amounts   are   greater   than  
$25,000.”174 The survey reports that the small claims award win rate for the
six year time span of the study was 37%.175 This compares quite
unfavorably with the 47% win rate for Customer/Member Awards during
the same time period.176 The survey shows that the relative win rates
between the two categories ebbed and flowed for individual years during
the time period, with the gap between the two the narrowest (only 2%) in
the last year of the survey, 2008.177
The survey also demonstrates that claimants do opt out of the default
paper hearing and request an oral hearing periodically.178 While the
percentage varies, a live hearing was held in cases initially qualifying for
Simplified Arbitration (i.e., damages of $25,000 or less), on average, 15%
of the time from 2002-2008.179 The survey also breaks down the win rates
for small claims awards between claimants who represent themselves and
claimants represented by counsel.180 For the six year time frame, claimants
were pro se in 45% of small claims cases that proceeded to an award, and
they prevailed in 37% of the awards.181 Notably, during the same time
frame, claimants represented by counsel also prevailed in 37% of the
awards,182 suggesting that having counsel had no impact on  the  customer’s  
likelihood of winning any monetary amount.
171. Id. at 1666 n.166.
172. See generally 2008 Award Survey: Perspective & Resurgence, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2009, at 1.
173. The author defined a “win” as “[a]ny monetary award in favor of the Claimant.” Id. at 4
chart 1.
174. Id. at 3. Up until 2012, the monetary threshold for FINRA Simplified Arbitration claims
was $25,000. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
175. 2008 Award Survey, supra note 172, at 4 chart 1.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 5 chart 2.
179. Id. During the time period, for individual years the rate varied from a low of 9% (2005)
to a peak of 29% (2007). Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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The publisher updated its survey statistics in its 2009 and 2010 yearend volumes of Securities Awards Monthly.183 The data shows that, in
2009, claimants prevailed in 40% of small claims securities arbitrations,
whereas customers prevailed in 50% of regular Customer/Member
awards.184 In 2010, the gap was even larger: 28% for small claims as
opposed to 53% for Customer/Member awards.185
While the SAC Award Survey and its updates provide useful data, it is
difficult to draw any conclusions from the data. The sample size is fairly
small (only a few hundred small claims awards in any individual year), and
“win   rate”   counts   any   recovery   as   a   “win,”   even   if   the   customer,   for  
example, asked for $24,000 in damages but was awarded $24.00.186 In
addition, the “win rates” varied greatly during the time period, with few
other variables changing.187 For example, in some years claimants who had
an oral hearing recovered a higher percentage of the time than claimants
who proceeded on the papers.188 In other years, the opposite was true.189
Moreover, most FINRA arbitration awards do not include an explanation as
to  the  outcome,  or  any  basis  for  the  arbitrator’s  award,190 so it is difficult to
determine  the  reasons  for  the  “win.”    Finally,  because  any  measure  of  “win  
rates”   in   arbitration   cannot   account   for   differences   in   the   type   of   claim,  
level of proof, and quality of evidence, as well as variations in the law
across jurisdictions,191 the resulting comparisons have limited utility when
assessing the substantive fairness of the process.
As a result of the difficulties in measuring the substantive fairness of
arbitration outcomes, dispute resolution scholars study procedural justice as
a  more  accessible  predictor  of  parties’  assessment of the overall fairness of
a process.192 Procedural justice scholars point to four key elements that

183. See Harry A. Jacobwitz, 2010: Year in Review, SEC. AWARDS MONTHLY, May, 2011, at
9, 13 [hereinafter 2010 Awards Survey]; Contested Monetary Awards Chart – 2009, SEC.
AWARDS MONTHLY, 2009, at 16 [hereinafter 2009 Awards Survey].
184. 2009 Awards Survey, supra note 183, at 16.
185. 2010 Awards Survey, supra note 183, at 13.
186. See id.; see also 2008 Award Survey, supra note 172, at 4 chart 1 (“Any monetary award
in favor of the Claimant is counted as a ‘win.’”).
187. See 2008 Award Survey, supra note 172, at 5 chart 2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See JILL I. GROSS & BARBARA BLACK, PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES
ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION 6 (2008).
191. See 2008 Award Survey, supra note 172, at 4 chart 1.
192. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183
(2004) (theorizing importance of procedural justice for legitimacy of dispute resolution processes);
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“reliably   lead   people   to   conclude   that   a   dispute   resolution   process   is  
procedurally  fair”:  (1)  the  process  provides  an  opportunity  for  disputants  to
voice their concerns to a third party; (2) the disputants perceive that the
third party actually considered these concerns; (3) the disputants perceive
that   the   third   party   treated   them   in   an   “even-handed”   way;;   and   (4)   the  
disputants feel that they were treated in a dignified and respectful
manner.193 These scholars have concluded that procedural fairness
perceptions strongly impact substantive fairness perceptions, which, when
favorable, can instill greater trust in and respect for the decision-maker and
result in a greater willingness for disputants to comply with the outcome.194
At least one empirical study has shown significantly decreased
perceptions of fairness in small claims arbitration when compared to
arbitration with an oral hearing.195 In 2006-08, Professor Barbara Black196
and  I  conducted  a  mailed  survey  of  participants’  perceptions  of  fairness  in  
recent securities arbitrations.197 Our  survey  results  demonstrated  that:  “(1)  
investors have a far more negative perception of securities arbitration than
all other participants, (2) investors have a strong negative perception of the
bias of arbitrators in the securities arbitration forum, and (3) investors lack
knowledge   of   the   securities   arbitration   process.”198 While we contended

Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections Where It Fits in a System of Justice, 3
NEV. L.J. 289, 297 (2003).
193. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from
Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52 (2004) (citing Nancy A.
Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do With It?, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 820-26, 841-44 (2001)); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Judging Arbitration:
The Findings of Procedural Justice Research, in AAA HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 41, 48-49 (Thomas E. Carbonneau et al. eds., 2006) (“[A]ny assessments of the
procedural fairness of arbitration by arbitration litigants will depend on several variables: whether
they are allowed to participate in, or at least observe, the process firsthand; and whether they
believe the arbitrator is unbiased, gave fair consideration to their evidence, treated all parties
equally, and treated them in a dignified fashion.”).
194. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 137-38 (2011) (“Simply put, the empirical evidence suggests that
individuals value fairness of process, separate and apart from outcome, because of the special
message that fairness of process sends to its recipients: an authority who acts in a fair manner is an
authority who is legitimate and cares about the dignity and social standing of those who stand
before it.”); Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study
of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 356
(2008); Franck, supra note 23, at 214-15.
195. Gross & Black, When Perception Changes Reality, supra note 194, at 354.
196. Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law.
197. Gross & Black, When Perception Changes Reality, supra note 194, at 354, 357-82
(detailing the survey’s development and design, methodologies, error structure and results).
198. Id. at 354.
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that, at least in part, factors other than the substantive fairness of the forum
are  responsible  for  investors’  negative  perceptions  of  FINRA  arbitration, 199
we  also  acknowledged  that  the  survey’s  results  clearly  called  for  some  type  
of reform.200
That survey and the resulting report did not, however, focus on
simplified arbitration.201 For purposes of this article, using the raw data
from that study, I isolated responses from survey participants who reported
that their most recent securities arbitration was a paper case as opposed to a
live hearing to compare perceptions of fairness by participants in simplified
arbitration to those of participants in arbitration with an oral hearing.202 My
analysis showed significant jumps in negative perceptions of fairness for
survey participants whose most recent experience in securities arbitration
was a simplified arbitration. For example, 38.1% of all survey participants
either   agreed   or   strongly   agreed   with   the   statement   “the   arbitration   panel  
was   impartial,”   and   35.1%   of   all   survey participants either disagreed or
strongly disagreed with that statement.203 After isolating the responses from
survey participants whose most recent case was scheduled to proceed to a
hearing or a paper case, the data tells an even more negative story.204 For
survey participants whose case was scheduled to proceed to a hearing,
40.46% agreed with the statement that the panel was impartial. By contrast,
only 25.97% of survey participants whose most recent securities arbitration
was a paper case agreed with that statement.
199. Id. at 396-99.
200. Id. at 400. In direct response to the survey results, FINRA enacted several reforms of its
arbitration procedures, including requiring arbitrators to write an “explained decision” if all parties
request it. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Requirement That Arbitrators
Provide an Explained Decision, 74 Fed. Reg. 6928, 6928-29 (Feb. 11, 2009) (citing survey results
as one catalyst for the revised rule change proposal). FINRA also changed the composition of a
three-arbitrator panel in customer cases to provide an all-public panel. See Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Panel Composition Rule, 76 Fed. Reg.
6500, 6500 (Feb. 4, 2011) (acknowledging FINRA sought rule change “to address the perception
that FINRA’s mandatory inclusion of a nonpublic arbitrator (often referred to as the ‘‘industry’’
arbitrator) in the Majority Public Panel is not fair to customers.”).
201. Gross & Black, When Perception Changes Reality, supra note 194, at 367; see also
GROSS & BLACK, PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 190, at
22.
202. That raw data is not published anywhere but is available in the final Codebook, and the
statistician consultants also ran a statistical analysis of the Codebook data involving small claims
disputes. Both of these documents are on file with the author.
203. GROSS & BLACK, PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note
190, at 30 (responses to Question 19). Another 12.6% of survey participants answered “do not
know.” Id. at 30 (responses to Question 19).
204. Since many survey participants reported that their most recent case was resolved before
the hearing phase, the sample size of respondents to this question whose most recent arbitration
was either resolved on the papers or scheduled for a hearing is much smaller.
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Similarly, while 35% of total survey participants agreed with the
statement   “I   am   satisfied   with   the   outcome”   (and   55%   disagreed),205 only
27% of survey participants whose cases were paper cases agreed with that
statement (and 67% disagreed). Finally, 39% of survey participants agreed
and   48%   disagreed   with   the   statement:   “As   a   whole,   I   feel   that   the  
arbitration   process   was   fair.”206 However, of respondents whose most
recent arbitration was a small claims case, only 31% agreed with that
statement whereas 61% disagreed. While 34% of all survey participants
agreed  with  the  general  statement  that  “the  securities  arbitration  process  is  
conducted  by  the  arbitrators  in  a  way  that  is  fair  to  all  parties  involved,”207
only 29.5% of respondents who had a recent paper case agreed with the
statement.
This survey data demonstrates that participants in small claims
arbitration have increased negative perceptions of the fairness of the
process. Again, this data has limited value, because the sample size is
much smaller than the sample size of the study as a whole.208 In addition,
for some questions, survey participants were answering about their overall
experiences as opposed to their recollection of their most recent
experience.209 Survey research experts agree that responses based on the
most recent experience are more reliable than overall impressions because
they  minimize  recall  bias  (people’s  ability  to  accurately  recall  details  of  past  
events declines over time).210 Thus, the responses that purport to be about a
simplified arbitration case could actually be about a combination of
experiences in arbitration. However, it is hard to ignore the overall
conclusion that participants in simplified arbitration at FINRA have more
negative perceptions about the fairness of the process than participants in
non-simplified arbitrations.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO SMALL CLAIMS ARBITRATION
In  light  of  lower  “win  rates”  and  more  negative  perceptions  of  fairness  
of small claims arbitration, why have all of the major arbitration service
providers chosen to implement paper hearings for resolving small dollar
value disputes, rather than a more traditional arbitration model or some

205. GROSS & BLACK, PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note
190, at 38 (responses to Question 27).
206. Id. at 45 (responses to Question 34).
207. Id. at 50 (responses to Question 38b).
208. Id. at 23.
209. Id. at 15.
210. Id. at 11.
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other alternative? Court systems did not rely on paper hearings as the
default method to resolve small claims lawsuits.211 Indeed, the history of
the small claims court movement suggests that the impetus to develop the
small claims court was crowded dockets and a need for individuals to be
heard and air grievances in a quick, cost-effective, and fair process without
the expense of lawyers.212
One explanation may be the lack of alternatives. If the arbitration
forums’   current   process   for   resolving   small   claims   is   not   effective,   then  
what process is a better alternative? The possibilities include on-line
dispute resolution   (“ODR”),   telephonic   arbitration,   and   a   small   claims  
arbitrator.
A. On-Line Dispute Resolution
Some ADR scholars have touted ODR as an effective mechanism to
resolve small claims disputes, in particular low dollar-value consumer
complaints.213 ODR encompasses a variety of ADR mechanisms that have
been adapted to the internet; the most widely used ODR processes are
automated negotiation, mediation or conciliation, arbitration,214 and
chargebacks for fraudulent credit card transactions.215
ODR providers have developed mechanisms for resolution that are a
hybrid of ADR processes, a reflection of the flexibility and responsiveness
of ODR. 216 Supporters  of  these  mechanisms  point  to  ODR’s  convenience,  
211. See, e.g., The Small Claims Court: A Guide to its Practical Use, CAL. DEP’T OF
CONSUMER AFFAIRS, passim, http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small_claims/small_claims.pdf
(last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
212. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
213. E.g., Fred Galves, Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce
Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient, and Secure, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 43
(2009); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Balancing the Scales: The Ford-Firestone Case, the Internet, and
the Future Dispute Resolution Landscape, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 30 (2003/2004) (noting that
“[c]onflicts that would have been weeded out of traditional mechanisms [such as low dollar-value
consumer complaints] via a cost-benefit analysis may make sound financial sense if handled
through ODR.”). ODR may be particularly effective in resolving international consumer disputes
because no mechanisms currently exist. See Ivonnely Colón-Fung, Protecting The New Face of
Entrepreneurship: Online Appropriate Dispute Resolution and International Consumer-ToConsumer Online Transactions, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 233, 245 (2007).
214. Concerns regarding the enforceability of on-line arbitration agreements are diminished
because the FAA’s strong pro-arbitration policy combined with the Electronic Signature Act
(“ESign”) make electronic contracts as enforceable as paper contracts. Amy J. Schmitz, “DriveThru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62
BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 184 (2010).
215. See Pablo Cortes, The Potential of Online Dispute Resolution as a Consumer Redress
Mechanism pt. 4(iv) (July 6, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998865.
216. See id. at pt. 1.
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low cost, speed, efficiency, predictability and security.217 The  “disputants’  
ability to consult legal on- and off-line resources on their own . . . reduce[s]
costs   dramatically.”218 The process takes less time, because steps such as
traveling to a forum and the need to set up appointments are eliminated.219
On-line   arbitration   also   simplifies   the   third   party   neutrals’   “case  
management   abilities,”220 such   as   the   ability   to   use   “computer   facilitated  
charts,  figures,  graphs,  scales,  tables,  and  diagrams”  in  proceedings,  which  
enhances otherwise static images.221 In addition to more interactive data,
moving these proceedings on-line allows the third party neutral to use
computer technology to perform functions such as word or phrase searches
and linking documents through hypertext technology.222
Detractors criticize ODR because it loses the emotional aspect of
dispute resolution, it diminishes the value of lawyers, it is difficult to
enforce mediated settlements, the process still has a lack of standards,
guidelines, and regulations, parties may offer substandard presentations, it
does not accommodate cultural diversity, and there is difficulty measuring
success rates.223 In addition, some ODR processes take the form of
adjudication by a third party neutral whose decisions are based on on-line
written submissions without affording disputants the opportunity for an inperson hearing.224 As a result, current ODR mechanisms, while viable
alternatives in certain cases, do not offer increased fairness when there are
disputed  issues  of  fact  and  witnesses’  credibility  is  important.225

217. Galves, supra note 213, at 42; Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 213, at 29.
218. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 213, at 29.
219. Id.
220. Haitham A. Haloush & Bashar H. Malkawi, Internet Characteristics and Online
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 327, 343 (2008).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 344. On-line arbitration has found success in resolving domain name disputes.
Pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”), designed to protect
trademarked businesses from cyber-squatting, users agree to settle any future disputes through online arbitration. Aashit Shah, Using ADR To Resolve Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25,
¶ 8 (2004). Complaints that a domain name infringes on a trademark are heard before an on-line
dispute resolution provider, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).
WIPO assigns an arbitrator to resolve the dispute. While the process is typically resolved within
two months and considered to be very “successful,” unlike off-line arbitration, it is not binding
and either party can bring the case in court within ten days of the decision. Id.
223. Lan Q. Hang, Comment, Online Dispute Resolution Systems: The Future of Cyberspace
Law, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 857-58 (2001).
224. See Cortes, supra note 215, pt. 4(vi).
225. See Haloush & Malkawi, supra note 220, at 343; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 270 (1970) (“[W]here credibility and veracity are at issue . . . written submissions are a
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.”).
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Scholars insist that rapid technological development and internet
capabilities allow for ODR to provide a forum for efficient resolution of
disputes without sacrificing due process or legitimacy of results.226 A
number of newer ODR processes provide disputants the opportunity to
interact with opposing parties and the third party neutral in addition to
written submissions.227
ODR providers utilize telephone and
videoconferencing to allow for questioning of witnesses and presentation of
oral arguments.228 In addition to evaluation of written submissions, ODR
provider DotComJustice provides for examination and cross-examination of
witnesses as well as oral arguments by telephone or videoconferencing
upon the request of the parties and at the discretion of the third party
neutral.229 The AAA now provides on-line mediation for claims under
$10,000 between two parties via on-line chat rooms and instant
messaging.230 A mediator facilitates joint discussions between the parties
and private discussions with each individual party in an on-line chat
room.231
Concilianet, an on-line dispute resolution system run by the Mexican
Consumer  Protection  Federal  Agency  (“Profeco”),  provides  for  a  settlement  
hearing for consumers who have purchased goods or services from
participating suppliers.232 The consumer submits a complaint through the
on-line system based on any allegation of non-compliance with terms
agreed to in the sale or supply of the product or service.233 Once Profeco
has determined that it is competent to hear the complaint, it will schedule
the date and time for a settlement hearing.234 The settlement hearing takes
place  in  Concilianet’s  virtual  courtroom,  and  the  consumer,  supplier,  and  a  
third party are present.235 Notably, consumers cannot seek monetary
damages through Concilianet; the system provides only remedies of strict

226. See Galves, supra note 213, at 8.
227. Id. at 44.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 55-62.
230. AAA Online Mediation for Claims under $10,000, AAA, http://services.adr.org/
eroom/faces/welcome_and_steps.jspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
231. Id.
232. Concilianet, ¿Que Es Concilianet?, PROFECO, http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/
concilianet/faces/que_es.jsp (What is Concilianet?) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
233. Concilianet, Preguntas Frecuentes, PROFECO, http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/
concilianet/faces/preguntas_frecuentes.jsp (FAQ) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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compliance with the contractual agreement between supplier and
consumer.236
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”)  Working  Group  III  on  Online  Dispute  Resolution  has  been  
tasked with preparing a framework for a global system of ODR for crossborder electronic commerce transactions.237 Early on in its existence, the
group recognized the limitations of arbitration for the settlement of
consumer internet disputes, and purposed to find creative solutions for the
development of on-line dispute resolution mechanisms.238 While the
group’s  attention  is  focused  on  resolution  of  disputes  resulting  from  crossborder on-line transactions, its proposals nevertheless are relevant to
resolution of small claims arising from transactions not necessarily
involving the internet.239 The draft proposal rules for ODR which the
working group has developed for low-value, high-volume transactions
provide for written submissions by both parties, followed by a negotiation
phase between the parties.240 If the parties are unable to come to agreement
by themselves, a facilitated settlement phase follows in which a third party
is appointed to facilitate communication between the parties in an attempt
to reach agreement.241 If this phase is also inconclusive, a third phase
follows of final and binding arbitration by the third party.242 Only when the
first two phases—direct interaction and communication between the parties,
and then interaction of the parties with the third party—have been
unsuccessful does the dispute proceed to adjudication by arbitration.243 The
working group is considering the use of emerging technology to utilize
videoconferencing hearings in the on-line process.244

236. Id.
237. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Grp. III (Online Dispute Resolution),
Annotated Provisional Agenda on its 25th Sess., May 21-25, 2012, ¶¶ 5, 7, 9-10, 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.111 (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2769836.
48538589.html.
238. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 9-10.
239. See id.
240. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Grp. III (Online Dispute Resolution), Online
Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions; Draft Procedural Rules,
Nov. 14-18, 2011, ¶¶ 6, 35, 51-52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.109 (Sept. 27, 2011), available
at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1556499.30238724.html.
241. Id.
242. Id. ¶ 6. The working group continued its work on the preparation of legal standards on
ODR for cross-border electronic transactions at its most recent meeting in New York on May 2125 2012; the outcome documents have yet to be published. See Annotated Provisional Agenda,
supra note 237.
243. See Draft Procedural Rules, supra note 240, ¶¶ 6, 55, 69-71.
244. Id. ¶ 68.
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ODR may be well suited to provide for comprehensive and just
resolution of small claims disputes. Technology such as videoconferencing
and on-line chat rooms utilized by DotComJustice and the AAA provide
low-cost and efficient means of communication among disputants and third
parties.245 Concilianet’s   provision   for   settlement   hearings   via   a   virtual  
courtroom allows for real-time communication in order to facilitate
resolution.246 The draft laws of the UNCITRAL Working Group highlight
the increasing priority among international lawmakers on providing parties
to consumer disputes the opportunity to communicate via ODR mechanisms
in order to foster a more comprehensive and just process.247 The
mechanisms and processes of ODR are flexible and ever-advancing and,
provided they offer interpersonal communication with an arbitrator, offer a
feasible alternative for the arbitration of small claims disputes.248
B. Telephonic Hearings
To  address  concerns  about  an  arbitrator’s  ability  to  resolve  fact-based
disputes based solely on paper submissions and supporting documents, yet
limit the costs and burdens of an in-person hearing, forums not yet utilizing
it should consider offering a telephonic hearing option for small claims
arbitrations.249 Disputants of lower dollar claims are afforded the option for
telephonic hearings in AAA arbitration.250 In the securities context,
“[c]ustomer   disputes   with   their   brokers,   such   as   suitability,   breach   of  
fiduciary duty, and fraud claims, typically involve hotly-contested issues of
fact and credibility determinations, which arbitrators are hard-pressed to
resolve  based  solely  on  written  submissions.”251 FINRA could offer similar
procedural flexibility for disputants as is provided by AAA. In those
disputes in which a customer-claimant may not prefer an in-person hearing,
granting customers the option to elect a telephonic hearing would be a
245. See, e.g., Galves, supra note 213, at 43-44, 60.
246. Concilianet, Preguntas Frecuentes, supra note 233.
247. See Draft Procedural Rules, supra note 240 and accompanying text.
248. See Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 193, at 822-23.
249. See Hang, supra note 223, at 857-60 (discussing telephonic and video-chat supplements
to online dispute resolution).
250. See Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AAA, Rule E-6 (June 1,
2010), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer?   (follow   “Commercial Arbitration Rules
and Mediation Procedures”   hyperlink);;   see also Guidelines for Written Arbitration, AAA,
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer?   (follow   “Guidelines   for   Written   Arbitration”  
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
251. Jill Gross, et al., Comment Letter Concerning the Proposed Rule Change Relating to
Raising the Limit for Simplified Arbitration, SEC.GOV (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
comments/sr-finra-2012-012/finra2012012-5.pdf.
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welcomed improvement.252 Because an arbitrator could listen to a witness
tell a story and testify orally, telephonic hearings would presumably
enhance fairness perceptions regarding the arbitration process for claimants
and respondents alike.253
C. Small Claims Arbitrator
An additional option that the forums should consider is designing a
small claims arbitration process that permits a low cost live hearing before a
small claims arbitrator whose sole function is to arbitrate several small
claims cases each day.254 Like a small claims court process, the parties
would have the opportunity to present their case to an in-person arbitrator to
air their grievances and tell their stories. They would not be represented by
counsel, as the small claims arbitrator would be able to elicit the stories
from the parties.255
A small claims arbitrator would adhere to the time-honored tradition of
oral hearings in our legal system, which allows for interpersonal
communication amongst the neutral and the disputants.256 This solution
addresses the concerns about procedural justice, as each party would have
an opportunity to tell his or her story to an actual human being, who can
listen to the story, evaluate the evidence, decide issues of veracity and
credibility, and resolve factual disputes based on live testimony.257
More than forty years ago, the Supreme Court, in its seminal decision,
Goldberg v. Kelly,258 considered whether written submissions satisfy

252. See Galves, supra note 213, at 44-47.
253. See id. A related option could include videoconferencing hearings using available
technology such as Skype.
254. Popular small claims court television shows such as “Judge Judy” or “The People’s
Court” are actually small claims arbitrations, as the participants jointly agree to opt out of taking
their case to small claims court and have it heard before a private neutral pursuant to procedures to
which the parties consent.
See Arbitration TV Shows, NET-ARB, http://www.netarb.com/court_TV_shows.php/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
255. Zucker & Herr, supra note 76, at 350 (“[S]mall claims court gives litigants the
opportunity to simplify their legal disputes into one pre-printed form, exclude lawyers from the
process, and discuss their problem with a neutral fact finder, all without the burdensome process
of full-blown civil litigation.”).
256. Lewis v. Sup. Ct., 970 P.2d 872, 896 (Cal. 1999) (Kenndard, J., dissenting) (“When
advocates appear in a courtroom to explain their positions to the judge or judges who decide their
case, the judicial process loses its arid, abstruse, and remote character. A lively interchange
between counsel and the bench, not possible by the submission of written briefs, may lead a judge
to rethink his or her position and even alter the outcome of the proceeding.”).
257. See Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution, supra note 193, at 52.
258. 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (procedural due process required before terminating
welfare benefits).
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requirements of procedural due process in a welfare benefits hearing.259
While the Court was applying constitutional requirements of procedural due
process not applicable to arbitration,260 it also addressed the broader issue of
what it means for a litigant to be heard.261 The Court wrote:
[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard. It is not enough that a welfare
recipient may present his position to the decision maker in writing or
secondhand through his caseworker.
Written submissions are an
unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment
necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional
assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of
oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to
the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly
where credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many
termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory
basis for decision. . . . Therefore a recipient must be allowed to state his
262
position orally.

The same considerations apply to the context of small claims
arbitration, where the claimant frequently is a consumer, customer, or
individual investor, who lacks the ability to present his or her case the way
a trained lawyer could, with factual and legal analysis, arguments, and
supporting evidence. In customer or consumer cases, where the consumer
services company or brokerage firm has superior bargaining power and
resources, depriving claimants of an oral hearing is stripping them of their
only means to air their grievance: by telling their story and having an
opportunity to be heard. In light of the effective loss of the class arbitration
after AT&T Mobility, dispute systems designers should give serious
consideration to offering an oral hearing alternative—whether telephonic,
in-person, or via videoconference—to small claims disputants.
VII. CONCLUSION
A seasoned securities lawyer recently told me that AT&T Mobility is to
consumers what the McMahon decision was to the securities industry in
259. Id. at 255.
260. It is well-settled that there is no state action in private arbitration proceedings. See
Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 81, 109 (1992); Sarah
Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1, 4 (2005); Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional Mandate?, 26 Pace L. Rev. 73, 75 n. 10
(2005) (gathering cases); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 Ohio
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 369, 393 (2004).
261. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 268-69.
262. Id.
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1987.263 By requiring investors to arbitrate their securities law disputes
with their brokers, McMahon led to a sea change in the resolution of
securities disputes.264 Because individual investors arbitrated most of their
disputes with their brokerage firms, courts stopped deciding customerbroker disputes.265 Due to increased use of the process, the SEC had to step
up its surveillance of the fairness of the securities arbitration process, and
the forums, primarily FINRA, had to constantly evolve their rules and
procedures to ensure a level playing field for investors.266
Yet no substantive changes have been made to the simplified
arbitration process since McMahon. Investors still have no economically
feasible way of being heard in person for their claims of $50,000 or less.
In the realm of consumer disputes, commercial and consumer
arbitration service providers similarly rely on desk arbitration to resolve
small claims cases. The AT&T Mobility decision will lead to many more
small claims commercial and consumer disputes being filed in small claims
arbitration. Like in the securities industry however, document-based
arbitration simply does not provide the requisite level of procedural justice
to the party with the weaker bargaining power.
No forum is the panacea for resolving small claims disputes. However,
according to the literature, small claims court is effective.267 This may be
because it is inherently easier for decision-makers to resolve disputes fairly
when they hear live testimony, thus offering substantive justice.268 It also
may be because it provides disputants an opportunity to be heard in person,
even if briefly, and thus offers procedural justice.269 I submit it is likely
both. Dispute systems designers should look to the features of small claims
court that provide enhanced fairness, and design an economically viable
small claims arbitration process that offers both substantive and procedural

263. I credit the comment to Harry Walters, Esq.
264. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987); see also Gross,
McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 145, at 493-94.
265. See Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 145, at 494.
266. See id. at 512-16 (detailing the SEC’s robust oversight of the FINRA forum, including
its arbitration rules).
267. See Zucker & Herr, supra note 76, at 348.
268. See Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 837
(2011) (“[A] judge can best decide credibility by seeing the witness . . . it simply is not possible
for the Court to make the credibility determinations the parties argue are necessary by reviewing
only the paper record.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Id. at 830 (“Live procedures also have ‘softer’ values that the legal system cannot afford
to ignore: They are part of a process that signals to litigants that the legal system respects their
dignity as persons even when it rejects their arguments. Such signals are an important way that the
legal system projects an aura of legitimacy and thereby obtains public compliance with the law.”).
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justice by allowing disputants to air their grievances out loud to a thirdparty neutral. In other words, give them a voice.

